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Al Makin 
Homogenizing Indonesian Islam: 
Persecution of the Shia group in Yogyakarta 
Abstract: is article studies “the homogenizing movement” in Indonesian 
Islam propagated by conservative Sunni groups in the form of persecuting 
minorities. However, this paper particularly focuses on the case of a Shia 
intellectual group in Yogyakarta called Rausyan Fikr which was persecuted 
by the radical Indonesian Jihad Front (FJI) group in November and 
December 2013. is paper índs that the scenario to terrorize the Rausyan 
was not an isolated incident, but the case is part of a grand homogenizing 
movement in the country. In addition, the anti-Shia propaganda was 
planned by local perpetrators and national actors: local radicals who 
persecuted the Shia and conservative activists who propagated anti-Shia 
ideology in national level. is paper oﬀers fresh accounts of the two new 
forces which played vital roles in the Rausyan incident: the activists of 
the Council of Young Intellectual Ulama of Indonesia (MIUMI), who 
propagated anti-Shia sentiment, and the radical group FJI, which was 
directly responsible for terrorizing the Shia in Yogyakarta.
Keywords:  Shia in Indonesia, Islamic Radicalism and Conservatism, Attacks 
on Religious Minorities, Homogenizing Islam.
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Abstrak: Artikel ini mempelajari “gerakan homogenisasi” Islam Indonesia 
yang dimotori oleh kelompok-kelompok Sunni konservatif terlihat dalam 
kasus penyerangan kaum minoritas. Tulisan ini memilih kasus kelompok 
intelektual Syiah di Yogyakarta yang disebut Rausyan Fikir, yang diserang 
oleh kelompok radikal FJI (Front Jihad Islam) pada bulan November dan 
Desember 2013. Tulisan ini mengemukakan bahwa skenario terror terhadap 
Rausyan bukanlah kejadian yang berdiri sendiri, tetapi kasus ini merupakan 
bagian dari gerakan besar homogenisasi Islam Indonesia. Propaganda anti-
Syiah ini dirancang dan didukung oleh aktor level nasional dan lokal: 
kelompok radikal lokal berperan sebagai pelaksana penyerangan, sementara 
aktivis konservatif level nasional telah menyebarkan propaganda anti-Syiah. 
Tulisan ini mengungkap fakta segar dari lapangan tentang dua kekuatan 
utama yang berperan dalam kasus Rausyan: aktivis yang tergabung dalam 
MIUMI (Majelis Intelektual Ulama Muda Indonesia), yang menyebarkan 
propaganda anti-Syiah, dan kelompok radikal FJI, yang secara langsung 
bertanggungjawab dalam menteror kelompok Syiah ini di Yogyakarta. 
Kata kunci: Syiah, Radikalisme dan Konservatisme dalam Islam, Penyerangan 
Minoritas, Homogenisasi Islam.
 ﺕﺎﻋﺎﻤﳉﺍ ﺓﺩﺎﻴﻘﺑ ﻲﺴﻴﻧﻭﺪﻧﻹﺍ ﻡﻼﺳﻺﻟ «ﺲﻧﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻛﺮﺣ» ﻝﺎﻘﳌﺍ ﺍﺬﻫ ﻝﻭﺎﻨﺗ :ﺺﺨﻠﻣ
 ﺔﻋﻮﻤﳎ ﺔﻟﺎﺣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻚﻟﺫ ﰲ ﺍﺰﻛﺮﻣ ،ﺕﺎﻴﻠﻗﻷﺍ ﺩﺎﻬﻄﺿﺍ ﻞﻜﺷ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﻨﺴﻟﺍ
 ﻞﺒﻗ ﻦﻣ ﻡﻮﺠﻬﻠﻟ ﺖﺿﺮﻌﺗ ﺚﻴﲝ  ،ﺮﻜﻓ ﻥﺎﺷﻭﺭ ﻢﺳﺍ ﻞﻤﲢ ﺎﺗﺮﻛﺎﻴﻏﻮﻴﺑ ﺔﻴﻌﻴﺷ ﺔﻳﺮﻜﻓ
 .٢٠١٣ ﱪﻤﺴﻳﺩﻭ ﱪﻤﻓﻮﻧ ﰲ (FJI) ﻲﻣﻼﺳﻹﺍ ﺩﺎﻬﳉﺍ ﺔﻬﺒﺟ ﻰﻤﺴﺗ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻜﻳﺩﺍﺭ ﺔﻋﻮﻤﳎ
 ﻪﻨﻜﻟﻭ ،ﻼﺼﻔﻨﻣ ﺎﺛﺪﺣ ﻦﻜﻳ ﱂ ﻥﺎﺷﻭﺭ ﺪﺿ ﺏﺎﻫﺭﻹﺍ ﻮﻳﺭﺎﻨﻴﺳ ﻥﺃ ﱃﺇ ﻝﺎﻘﳌﺍ ﻞﺻﻮﺗﻭ
 ﻥﺃ ،ﻚﻟﺫ ﱃﺇ ﺔﻓﺎﺿﻹﺎﺑﻭ .ﻲﺴﻴﻧﻭﺪﻧﻹﺍ ﻡﻼﺳﻹﺍ ﺲﻧﺎﺠﺘﻟ ﻯﱪﻜﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻛﺮﳊﺍ ﻦﻣ ﺀﺰﺟ
 ﺕﺎﻋﺎﻤﳉﺎﻓ  :ﺔﻴﻠﺤﳌﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻨﻃﻮﻟﺍ ﺔﻠﻋﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻬﳉﺍ ﻞﺒﻗ ﻦﻣ ﺎﻬﻄﻴﻄﲣ ﰎ ﺔﻌﻴﺸﻟﺍ ﺪﺿ ﺕﺎﻳﺎﻋﺪﻟﺍ
 ﺪﻴﻌﺼﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﲔﻈﻓﺎﺤﳌﺍ ﺀﺎﻄﺸﻨﻟﺍ ﻥﺃ ﲔﺣ ﰲ ،ﻡﻮﺠﳍﺍ ﺬﻴﻔﻨﺘﺑ ﺖﻣﺎﻗ ﺔﻴﻠﺤﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻜﻳﺩﺍﺮﻟﺍ
 ﻝﻮﺣ ﺓﺪﻳﺪﺟ ﺔﻘﻴﻘﺣ ﻦﻋ ﻝﺎﻘﳌﺍ ﺍﺬﻫ ﻒﺸﻛﻭ .ﺔﻌﻴﺸﻟﺍ ﺪﺿ ﺕﺎﻳﺎﻋﺪﻟﺍ ﺮﺸﻨﺑ ﺍﻮﻣﺎﻗ ﲏﻃﻮﻟﺍ
 ﺲﻠﳎ ﰲ ﻥﻮﻤﻀﻨﳌﺍ ﺀﺎﻄﺸﻨﻟﺍ :ﱃﻭﻷﺍ ،ﻥﺎﺷﻭﺭ ﺔﺛﺩﺎﺣ ﰲ ﲔﺘﻛﺭﺎﺸﳌﺍ ﲔﺘﻴﺳﺎﺳﻷﺍ ﲔﺗﻮﻘﻟﺍ
 ﺪﺿ ﺕﺎﻳﺎﻋﺪﻟﺍ ﺮﺸﻨﺑ ﺍﻮﻣﺎﻗ ﻦﻳﺬﻟﺍ ﻢﻫﻭ ،(MIUMI) ﺏﺎﺒﺸﻟﺍ ﺀﺎﻤﻠﻌﻠﻟ ﻲﺴﻴﻧﻭﺪﻧﻹﺍ ﺮﻜﻔﻟﺍ
 ﱵﻟﺍ ﻲﻫﻭ ،ﻲﻣﻼﺳﻹﺍ ﺩﺎﻬﳉﺍ ﺔﻬﺒﺟ ﰲ ﺔﻤﻀﻨﳌﺍ ﺔﻳﻼﻜﻳﺩﺍﺮﻟﺍ ﺔﻋﻮﻤﺠﳌﺍ :ﺔﻴﻧﺎﺜﻟﺍﻭ ،ﺔﻌﻴﺸﻟﺍ
 .ﺎﺗﺮﻛﺎﻴﻏﻮﻴﺑ ﺔﻌﻴﺸﻟﺍ ﺪﺿ ﺮﺷﺎﺒﻣ ﻞﻜﺸﺑ ﺔﻴﺑﺎﻫﺭﻹﺍ ﺔﻴﻠﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﺕﺬﻔﻧ
 ﻡﻮﺠﻫ ،ﻡﻼﺳﻹﺍ ﰲ ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﳌﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻜﻳﺩﺍﺮﻟﺍ ،ﺎﻴﺴﻴﻧﻭﺪﻧﺇ ﰲ ﺔﻌﻴﺸﻟﺍ :ﺔﻴﺣﺎﺘﻔﳌا تﺎﻤﻠﻜﻟا
.ﻡﻼﺳﻹﺍ ﺲﻧﺎﲡ ،ﺕﺎﻴﻠﻗﻷﺍ ﺪﺿ
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Given the pluralism and dynamism of Indonesian Islam, one can perhaps argue that there are at least two opposing movements which were often involved in public battles 
in the aftermath of Soeharto’s fall marking the reform era (Makin 
2016a; Makin 2015b; Makin 2009). e ërst movement seeks 
to understand the pluralistic character of Islam contextualized in 
Indonesian society. is understanding can be seen in the works 
of many Muslim intellectuals (Kersten 2009), such as Nurcholish 
Madjid (Kull 2005), Abdurrachman Wahid (Wahid 2006; Barton 
1999), and Harun Nasution (Nasution 1989; Ishak 2010). ey 
sought to formulate a unique Indonesian Islamic identity that 
incorporates the plural cultures and traditions of the Indonesian 
archipelago, which are diﬀerent from the practices of Islam found in 
other Muslim countries. For Wahid, the practices and manifestations 
of Islam in Indonesian culture never showed only one form or 
school, but rather they revealed the many faces of Islam practiced 
diﬀerently according to local contexts. In Indonesia, the movement of 
pluralization, which also competed with the movement of orthodoxy 
and conservatism, coincided with the New Order’s political strategy 
to curb Islamist sentiment suspected to threaten the integrity of the 
state. e movement of pluralizing Islam was therefore supported by 
the New Order. What is more, many elite intellectuals, such as Mukti 
Ali (Munhanif 1996; Makin 2012) and Munawir Sjadzali, entered 
government and were entrusted with high bureaucratic positions 
(Makin 2012). Others, such as Harun Nasution (Nasution 1995; 
Nasution 1982; Nasution 1989), Amin Abdullah (Abdullah 1996), 
Azyumardi Azra (Azra 2006), Djohan Eﬀendy, Dawam Rahardjo, 
and others developed pluralist intellectual thought on campuses and 
in NGOs (Makin 2016a, 137–141; Kersten 2009). 
e second movement is conservative and radical groups which try 
to ‘homogenize’ Islam and establish a Sunni orthodoxy (Bruinessen 
2013; Makin 2016a). e homogenizing movement, like its pluralist 
counterparts, is never monolithic, but it consists of many groups with 
diﬀerent agendas, goals, and schools of thoughts. However, all of 
these share a common aim of establishing Islamic orthodox authority 
by which to condemn those who show a diﬀerent interpretation of 
Islam from theirs.1 Conservatives and radicals are, in fact, a minority 
in number, but their voice is louder particularly during the reformasi 
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era. is movement, however, was suppressed by the New Order. To 
brieìy touch upon the history of Indonesia in the period, President 
Soeharto simpliëed Islamic political parties into a single Development 
Unity Party (PPP) (Ropi 2008, 80). Islamic authority was channeled 
oﬃcially through the Ministry of Religious Aﬀairs and the MUI under 
government control (Bruinessen 2013; Woodward M et al. 2014; 
Schafer S 2015). Whereas the Ministry was dominated by pluralist 
Muslim intellectuals, the MUI often demonstrated conservative 
ideology with the goal of homogenizing Islam in order to establish the 
authority of Islamic orthodoxy under the council’s ìag. It can be said, 
however, that during the New Order period, the intellectual movement 
of pluralization prevailed due to, among other things, the political 
support of the regime (Nasir 2014, 12; Hefner 2000; Assyaukanie 
2009; Barton 1999). 
However, after Soeharto’s fall, in a freer public domain and amidst 
the euphoria of democratization, some conservative groups seized their 
opportunity. Conservatism and orthodoxy surged in both Indonesian 
politics and in the public sphere (Bruinessen 2013; Makin 2016a; 
Makin 2016b; Makin 2015b; Makin 2009). On the other hand, 
although pluralist thought ìourished, New Order government policy 
still oﬃcially guarded the oﬃcial ëve religions of Islam, Catholicism, 
Protestantism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, whereas marginal and 
minority groups—be they outside or within Islam—did not gain 
the state’s recognition. e government also tended to homogenize 
the Indonesian Muslim community by recognizing only a single 
Sunni denomination, whereas minority Islamic groups such as Shia, 
Ahmadiyah (Burhani 2014), and other groups, had neither oﬃcial 
recognition nor protection. e minority groups were easily persecuted 
by radicals and prosecuted in the courts. Indeed, some group leaders 
were arrested and jailed. For the government, the variety of groups and 
schools within Islam seemed too complicated, and this was understood 
as posing problems for the stability of the Islamic community. Rivalry 
between the pluralist and homogenization movements, however, had 
roots in the early history of the country. In the post-Suharto reform 
era (1998-), in the battle between the two factions and through the 
authority of the MUI, conservatives and radicals have branded their 
rivals as deviants, liberals, and apostates (Woodward M et al. 2014; 
Makin 2016a; Sodik 2015; Hasyim 2011).
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is article shows one of the cases in which the homogenizing 
movement showed force in public by persecuting a Shia group in 
Yogyakarta. is article argues that this case should not be treated as 
an isolated incident, but it should be viewed as a part of the broader 
trends of the homogenizing movement in the country. However, 
new actors, the FJI and MIUMI, took major roles in this anti-Shia 
campaign. is article seeks to contribute to the discussion of anti-Shia 
sentiment by relating the local case in Yogyakarta to the grand scheme 
of the homogenizing movement at the national level. To do this, the 
paper will discuss in turn: anti-Shia sentiment in Indonesia, narrating 
the incident from the victims’ point of view, the roles of the FJI and 
MIUMI in the persecution, and the position and attitude of the MUI 
and those of the local authorities.
Anti-Shia Sentiment
In the history of Islamic theology, the major division between 
Sunni and Shia emerged in the seventh-eighth centuries mainly due 
to political conìict following the death of the Prophet Muhammad 
over the succession of his leadership. But in Indonesia, the division 
between the two Islamic schools was blurred in the early period 
of the penetration of Islam into the archipelago. e practices of 
both schools intermingled with various local traditions, as Islam in 
the archipelago consisted of mixed teachings and practices of Shia 
and Sunni, particularly on Sumatra, Java, and Sulawesi. Although 
traditionally associated with Shi’ism, the celebration of ‘Āshūrā’ on the 
10th of Muharram to commemorate the martyrdom of Husain, a son 
of Ali and grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, can still be found 
in various places in Indonesia (Formichi 2014b; Zulkiìi 2013; Feener 
1999; Alatas 1999; Hasim 2012). Given this, the identity of Shia, 
particularly vis-à-vis that of the Sunni majority, in the history of the 
archipelago was rather ìuid (Formichi 2014a). It can also be said that 
the identity formation of both Shia and Sunni groups in Indonesia, 
and thus clear diﬀerentiation between the two in public, only began 
during the late New Order and reform periods. Prior to this period, 
the Shia mingled with the Sunni majority, and their appearance, which 
was not signiëcantly diﬀerent from that of Sunni Muslims, was barely 
noticed (Jones 1980). What is more, the largest Muslim organization, 
NU, claimed to contain Shia elements in their religiosity and piety, 
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as the members of the organization highly venerated the Prophet 
Muhammad and his family, including his son in law, Ali b. Abi Talib. 
For many NU leaders, the diﬀerences between Sunni and Shia should 
not be exaggerated (Siradj 2013). Muhammadiyah also shows a rather 
lenient attitude toward Shi’ism. Of the leaders of the organization, 
Amien Rais was sympathetic toward the Iranian revolution and its 
intellectuals (Zulkiìi 2013). However, lately some younger generation 
Muhammadiyah ëgures have exhibited a stern attitude towards the 
minority. Nonetheless, by the end of the New Order and reform 
periods the role of Shia in public began to receive attention from the 
Sunni majority, particularly after the Iranian revolution, whose impact 
upon both the growth of Shia adherents, groups, and activities, and 
orthodox Sunni responses to them, began to emerge in the public 
arena (Marcinkowski 2008). e literature on Shi’ism, not limited to 
the works translated from Iranian writers but also the works penned 
by Indonesians, increased. is served as an impulse to the growth of 
Shia ‘sympathizers’ who read Shia works for the purpose of intellectual 
endeavors and for the development of Shia religious practices. What 
is more, some Indonesians started to embrace Shia theology and íqh 
(Islamic law). In fact, during the New Order period some pesantren 
and yayasan (foundations) with Shia aﬃliations were established across 
Java. Many young Indonesian Muslims also went to Qum, Iran, to 
further their knowledge of Shi’ism (Zulkiìi 2009a), and Shia centers 
were also built in Indonesia. In short, Shia intellectuals became more 
prominent. In this critical period, Shia adherents and sympathizers 
realized their minority status among the Indonesian Sunni majority 
and began to search for a clearer identity, whereas Sunni conservatives 
and radicals became increasingly alarmed at the Shia’s increasing role in 
the public domain. e warning about the danger posed by the Shia 
towards the Sunni delivered by the Indonesian Council for Islamic 
Preaching (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia/DDII) inìuenced the 
MUI to discredit the minority. As a result, the MUI issued a fatwa on 
the danger of the Shia for the Sunni majority (Latief 2008). 
Indeed, the DDI was incredibly inìuential and vocal in expressing 
anti-Shia sentiment in Indonesia. According to Zulkiìi, the DDI, 
founded by the former leader Masyumi M. Natsir (1908-1993) in 
1967, had genealogical links to Persis (founded in 1923) which spread 
anti-Shia sentiment towards the end of the Dutch colonial period. 
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Natsir was a student of A. Hassan (1887-1958), a Persis leader (Zulkiìi 
2013). Indeed, since its establishment Persis had the vital mission of 
puriëcation of Islam. It is not surprising that the DDI inherited the 
Persis ideology, due to which during the New Order and reform periods 
the DDI served as a pulpit for conservative Muslim activists to voice 
their ideology of homogenization (Makin 2009; Makin 2015b). In 
addition, the DDI had links to Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia through 
the Rabitah Alam Islami (Muslim World League), an international 
organization through which Arab Wahhabism marked with anti-Shia 
feeling has been promoted throughout the world. It is important to 
note that Natsir was an activist of the League. 
On the other hand, the two largest organizations NU and 
Muhammadiyah do not show a monolithic attitude toward Shia. 
Within each of these organizations there are diﬀerences in political 
attitude and ideology. NU, for example, exhibits at least two diﬀerent 
faces: Abdurrachman Wahid’s liberal and pluralist attitude, and those 
of conservative leaders such as Ma’ruf Amin who also served as the 
MUI’s chairman. Likewise, Muhammadiyah is the home to both Amin 
Rais, who showed sympathy to Shia, and Yunahar Ilyas, who has not 
(discussed below). 
In the discourse of the anti-Shia movement, the diﬀerences between 
Sunni and Shia are stressed. e MUI’s tawṣiyah (religious advice) on 
Shia in 1984 highlights the diﬀerences between the two on the matters 
of leadership and succession in the aftermath of the death of the 
Prophet (Shi’ism rejects the classical caliphates of Abu Bakr, Umar, and 
Uthman); in the criteria of accepting the hadiths as a source of Islamic 
jurisprudence (the Shia reject prophetic traditions not from their own 
group); in ijmā‘ (Muslim scholars’ consensus); and the doctrine of 
the infallibility of imām (aiming at establishing its own leadership in 
Indonesia) (Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) 2011, 46–47). In 1996, 
the issue of contract marriage (mut‘ah) was also raised in the council. 
During the New Order period anti-Shia propaganda was limited to 
meeting rooms and books (Formichi 2014b; Zulkiìi 2013; Zulkiìi 
2009b), while in the reform period this was transformed into action 
by radical Sunni groups which attacked or intimidated their Shia 
counterparts (Formichi 2014b; Hasim 2012).
It is true that the movement of homogenization of Islam can be 
traced back to the New Order or earlier in the spirit of puriëcation, 
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Sunni orthodoxy, and radicalization, which since the 1980s has 
contributed to diminishing the uniquely syncretic practices of Islam 
in Indonesia (Ricklefs 2012; Hefner 2000). Furthermore, after the fall 
of Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998, a period marked by robust 
growth of radicalized groups  ensued in which the homogenization 
movement gained momentum (Bruinessen 2013; Hefner 2010; 
Makin 2009; Makin 2015b). Radical groups emerged and terrorized 
the public into propagating their ideology and standard of morality 
(Makin 2015b). During the reform era, the minorities, such as Shia, 
Ahmadiyah, Christian minorities (Makin 2016b), and local religions, 
were often attacked by radicals (Makin 2016a). Ironically, whenever 
radicals attacked certain weak minorities, the police arrested the victims 
and allowed the perpetrators to walk free. In short, the government 
tended to criminalize the victims (Hasani and Naipospos 2012).
is article attempts to contribute to the discussion of the anti-Shia 
sentiment in Indonesia in two respects. Firstly, this work reveals the 
role of the local radical group FJI in Yogyakarta which was directly 
responsible for terrorizing victims on the ground. Secondly, this article 
is the ërst study which sheds light on the conservative think-tank group 
MIUMI which propagated anti-Shia sentiment in their websites and 
sponsored meetings among many conservative and radical groups to 
consolidate the force. is study thus oﬀers fresh accounts of new actors 
and factors in the anti-Shia propaganda during the reform period not 
taken into account in previous research (Feener and Formichi 2015; 
Formichi 2014b; Formichi 2014a; Zulkiìi 2013; Schafer S 2015; 
Zulkiìi 2009a). e next section will focus on the narratives of the 
attack.
Narrating the Persecution 
is study will further delve into the existing studies of Shia group 
Rausyan Fikr in Yogyakarta (Takwin et al. 2016, 66–72; Ajuba 2009). 
My writing focuses on the victims of 2013 anti-Shia campaign executed 
by the local radical group FJI and was based mostly on the interviews 
of the victims. To brieìy present the history of the group, the Rausyan 
Fikr was founded in 1995 (Ajuba 2009, 22) and is currently led by 
Safwan. e main activities of the group are holding regular discussions 
which attracted several students from Gadjah Mada University (UGM) 
and the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN)—which later becomes 
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the State Islamic University (UIN Sunan Kalijaga). e themes of their 
discussion were the thoughts of select Iranian thinkers, such as Ali 
Shariati or Murtadho Muthohari. From the beginning, the Rausyan 
centered its activities in a rented house on Kaliurang Street in the 
northern part of Yogyakarta. Students from other towns lived in the 
house while studying in Yogyakarta, and the house is still used as the 
Rausyan headquarters. Now, the Rausyan has about 500 members and 
welcomes new students to join their regular discussions. e current 
head of the forum, Safwan, joined the Rausyan in 1995. Safwan told 
me that the group attracts two kinds of members: those who retain 
Sunni theology but are interested in the Shia intellectual ideas, and 
those who converted to Shia. However, the Rausyan still focuses on 
intellectual endeavors (Safwan 2014a). 
Clearly, the Rausyan was founded during the rise of intellectual 
role of Shia in the Indonesian public sphere and the growth of Shia 
adherents during the New Order (Latief 2008; Zulkiìi 2009b). 
However, the current leader Safwan has never been to Qum to study 
Shia but learnt about Shia from the many Iranian teachers available in 
Indonesia since 1992. Safwan went to the University of Hasanuddin 
(UNHAS) in Makassar, Sulawesi to study oceanography in the same 
year, though he did not graduate. He then studied communication 
studies at UGM from 1994 to 1997, and at Diponegoro University 
(UNDIP) in Semarang, though again he did not complete his studies. 
Safwan and his family are adherents of Shia. His wife Andayani 
ënished her BA at UGM and her Masters’ degree at the School 
of Social Work at McGill University in Canada. She is currently a 
lecturer at UIN Sunan Kalijaga. It is important to note that neither of 
them ever felt they were members of minority as they felt integrated 
into the majority Sunni neighborhood in which they live and in their 
workplaces.
As occurred every year, on November 14, 2013, the Shia intellectual 
group held the 10th of Muharram sermon, to be attended by 70 people. 
e sermon was planned from between 1.30 and 5pm. However, two 
policemen arrived at the Rausyan headquarters warning that a Muslim 
group called the FJI lanned to attack the Rausyan. e policemen 
suggested Safwan make the sermon shorter, advice which he followed 
for safety reasons. Indeed, the sermon went ahead but ended early at 
3pm (Safwan 2014a; Safwan 2014b; Andayani 2014).  
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On November 21, a local government intelligence (Kominda) oﬃcer 
visited the Rausyan, whose leaders were then asked to present themselves 
at the district oﬃce of police intelligence (Kabid Intel Polda) to clarify 
the Rausyan’s activities. Surprisingly, to avoid future threats from the 
FJI, the intelligence police suggested Safwan remove the Rausyan Fikr 
sign on public display in front of the oﬃce. 
Rather than arresting the perpetrators, the police and the local 
government initiated a meeting between the perpetrators and the 
victims. On November 25, 2013, a meeting was held in the oﬃce of 
the Ministry of Religious Aﬀairs of Yogyakarta on Sukonanadi Street, 
attended by representatives from the Yogyakarta police (Polda), the 
local prosecutor’s oﬃce (Kejaksaan Tinggi), the Regional Intelligence 
Board (Badan Intelejen Daerah), the local MUI, the Department of 
Welfare Development and Social Protection (Kesbanglinmas), the 
local Ministry of Religious Aﬀairs (Kemenag), NU, the FJI, the Jihadi 
Council of Indonesia (MMI), the Rausyan Fikr, and the Indonesian 
Shia Community (Ahlu Bait Indonesia/ABI) (Kementrian Agama, 
Kantor Wilayah Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta 2013). However, the 
meeting, intended to promote dialogue between Shia and anti-Shia 
groups, became a means by which to further intimidate the victims. 
e MMI and the FJI forcefully demanded both that the government 
disband the Rausyan Fikr and that the MUI pronounce an edict 
on the deviant teachings of the Shia. During the meeting, the two 
radical organizations shouted obscenities and threatened to kill the 
representatives of the two Shia organizations: the ABI and Rausyan 
Fikr (Safwan 2014a).
In the aftermath of the meeting, the FJI continued to pose threats 
against the targeted group, spreading the following text message 
through cellphones: 
In the name of God, attend and show your real actions and attention 
to the deviant Shia group. Come to the MUI in Yogyakarta to demand 
the closure of the Rausyan Fikr. Come on ursday December 19, 2013, 
at 8.00 o’clock marching from the mosque of Dipowinatan. Show your 
courage. Ask your friends to join and spread this news. 
Upon receiving the threatening messages (see also Frontjihadislam.
or.id 2014c), the Rausyan Fikr reported the case to the police, who, 
however, asked the victims to minimize their response. On December 
19,  25 FJI went to the MUI oﬃce repeating the demand to pronounce 
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the fatwa on the deviance of the teachings of the Shia (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta 2013). 
Prior to the terrorizing, the police visited the Rausyan to warn them 
(Andayani 2014; see also Safwan 2014b). e news of the ërst terror 
in mid-November attracted the local media, as the Shia community 
in Yogyakarta, like other minority groups, had not previously been 
disturbed. e second terror event at the end of November was more 
dramatic, as a group of anti-Shia radicals gathered in Kridosono 
Square after congregational Friday prayers and prepared to march ten 
kilometers to the Rausyan headquarters on Kaliurang Street. e police 
once again suggested the Rausyan Fikr stop their activities. Safwan 
heeded their advice, evacuating his family to a safe place. 
Broader National Context: Homogenizing Indonesian Sunni Islam
is article argues that the anti-Shia movement in Yogyakarta 
should not be seen as a single incident, but should be put in the 
broader context of a national level movement, in which anti-Shia 
sentiment was exploited elsewhere in the country during the reform 
period, such as in Batang, Central Java, in 2000 and 2006, and in 
Bondowoso and Bangil in East Java in 2007, and through the spread 
of anti-Shia propaganda in Jember, East Java, in 2012 (Formichi 
2014b; Hasim 2012). e tragedy that occurred in Sampang, on 
Madura, in which a Shia group under the leadership of Tajul Muluk 
was attacked by Sunni neighbors is another salient illustration. eir 
houses were burned, they were expelled from their villages and 
moved to a shelter in Sidoarjo. In response to this tragedy, the MUI 
in East Java issued a fatwa branding the Shia as deviant. It is also not 
surprising that an anti-Shia organization ANNAS was also founded 
in Bandung in 2014 (Takwin et al. 2016, 63). Furthermore, this 
paper also argues that the anti-Shia sentiment in the country was part 
of a bigger scenario of homogenizing Sunni Islam in Indonesia, by 
which many Islamic minorities, such as Ahmadiyah groups in many 
provinces in Indonesia, were attacked by radicals and branded as 
deviant by the MUI (Formichi 2014b; Burhani 2014; Makin 2016a; 
Sodik 2015; Schafer S 2015). In short, the radical and conservative 
groups attempted to homogenize Sunni Indonesian Islam, by which 
they tried to ‘annihilate’ those who are considered ‘deviant’ (Makin 
2016a, 11). e Shia is one of the targeted groups.
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As mentioned earlier, anti-Shia sentiment was nurtured by the 
DDI and the MUI since the New Order period (Formichi 2014b) and 
gained momentum in the reform era in both the political and public 
domains, so much so that the sentiment often became a political tool 
for Islamist politicians to attract sympathy from conservative groups. 
For example, Suryadharma Ali, the Minister of Religious Aﬀairs from 
the Islamist Unity and Development Party (PPP), publicly denounced 
Shia victims in Sampang by branding them as ‘deviant’ and thereby 
justifying the attack (Badudu 2013). us, during the reform era, 
the ‘homogenization’ movement has penetrated the political domain, 
whereas during the New Order the regime maintained distance between 
Islam and politics. 
One of the contributions of this paper in the discussion of 
discriminating minorities in Indonesia is in revealing the roles of new 
conservative activists—such as Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi, Bachtiar Nasir, 
Syamsuddin Arif, Adian Husaini, and Adnin Armas2 who founded the 
MIUMI—in propagating the anti-Shia feeling. Most of these activists 
had links to Malaysian universities and the modern Islamic boarding 
school in Gontor, East Java. Some MIUMI activists are also activists of 
the INSISTS and Hidayatullah.com, a conservative website dedicated to 
ëght liberalism, pluralism, and westernization.3 Other Muhammadiyah 
activists such as Syamsul Hidayat, Fahmi Salim, and Adian Husaini 
also joined the MIUMI, which also recruited other Islamic conservative 
organizations such as DDI, Al-Irsyad, and Wahdah Islamiyah (Ilyas 
2014). At the national level, these Islamist activists played a vital role 
in nurturing public sentiment (Kadir 2013; Hasib 2013; Hasib 2014) 
and establishing relations with Islamist political parties and radical 
organizations (Miumipusat.org 2013b). In relation to the Islamist 
political parties, Bachtiar Nasir, for instance, had close relation to 
Hasyim Ning (from the PPP), who hosted a meeting of several Islamic 
political parties prior to the 2014 presidential election (Safwan 2014a). 
In its relationships to radical groups, MIUMI consolidated a meeting 
with the MMI on anti-Shia sentiment prior to the attack on the Rausyan 
(explained below). In addition, the MIUMI claimed to support the 
activities of the MUI in guarding the faith of the ‘ummah (Muslim 
community). However, the MIUMI seems dissatisëed with the MUI’s 
moderate attitude and demands a more conservative ideology in the 
council.4 On the other hand, current MIUMI activists have links to 
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the previous anti-Shia movement in Indonesia, such as with LDII/
DDI, Hidayatullah.com, and other conservative groups. From their 
online postings shared through social networks we can see that these 
Islamist activists are Muslim intellectuals who harbor an anti-moderate 
stance that opposes westernization, anti-secularization, pluralism, and 
feminism. On various occasions, these conservatives have attacked 
progressive Muslim intellectuals (Humas miumi 2014; Zarkasyi 2014; 
Miumipusat.org 2013a; Hadi 2014; Makin 2009; Makin 2015b).
Local Perpetrators: e FJI
is study further elaborates a previous NGO report of the local 
radical group FJI in Yogyakarta which was responsible for terrorizing the 
victims in Rausyan Fikr (Takwin et al. 2016). From the FJI’s websites 
and newspapers covering their activities we can learn about the group. 
e FJI was founded in 2011, and their base was located at 43 Bibis 
Street, Padokan Lor Tirtomolo, Kasihan, Bantul, Yogyakarta. Its website, 
www.frontjihadislam.or.id, explains that the FJI’s mission is to support 
the establishment of sharia (taṭbīq sharī‘ah) and to build an awareness 
of Islam kāﬀah (totality in embracing Islam) in Indonesian society 
(DPP, Front Jihad Islam 2013). e FJI’s agenda to implement sharia 
covers not only Front members but the whole Indonesian society. Like 
the FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) based in Jakarta under the leadership 
of Rizieq Shihab (Jahroni 2008; Jamhari 2003, 10; Woodward M et 
al. 2014), the FJI in Yogyakarta also promotes the principle of amar 
makruf nahi mungkar (promoting good and prohibiting evil) with 
‘stern’ (tegas) means. Many letters and public statements released by 
the FJI were signed by Wahyu Abdullah and Abu Muhammad who 
serve as its chairman and general secretary respectively. However, the 
two names seem to be pseudonyms, as in many public gatherings 
persons with these names were not in attendance. Instead, Abu Jibril 
(a prominent leader of the MMI/Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, who 
was once arrested in Indonesia on a terrorism charge and who often 
appears on the VOI/Voice of Islam and Arrahmah.com websites) and 
Irfan Awwas (another leader of the MMI) came into the public realm. 
On other occasions, Abdurrahman and Harris Damawan were also 
mentioned as the FJI’s leaders. It seems that the FJI is part of the MMI, 
a fact veriëed by Muhsin (secretary of the Yogyakarta MUI who will be 
discussed below) (Kamaludiningrat 2014).
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e FJI’s activities, like those of the FPI (Jahroni 2008), focused 
on ëghting ‘un-Islamic’ behaviors and promoting public piety. In the 
name of eradicating sinful deeds (ma‘ṣīyah) the FJI conducted raids on 
stores selling alcoholic beverages. For instance, in Kulonprogo, the FJI 
sent three members to investigate two karaoke premises, which were 
suspected of selling alcohol. e FJI then forced the them to shut down 
(Frontjihadislam.or.id 2014a; Frontjihadislam.or.id 2014b). Another 
attempt to promote public piety and prevent sinful deeds in public 
took place in September 2013, when the FJI protested against the 
Miss Universe contest in Bali, which it argued exhibits or displays the 
nakedness of women (Khalifah 2013a), and which in the eyes of the 
FJI promoted nothing but sinful deeds. On another occasion, the FJI 
called for war against the pecalangs (traditional Balinese village security) 
which were the main supporters of the Miss Universe contest (Khalifah 
2013b). 
e FJI also targeted a Christian group in Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta 
(Takwin et al. 2016). A priest called Sujarno, leader of a church in 
Girisubo, was threatened and asked to stop the plan to celebrate Easter 
at the end of March 2014. A rumor was spread that the church had 
no legal permit (Frontjihadislam.or.id 2014d; Frontjihadislam.or.id 
2014e; Frontjihadislam.or.id 2014f). Additionally, another rumor 
spread that the Easter ceremony was intended to convert Muslims 
to Christianity. Not only did the FJI recruit supporters to protest 
the plan, the Front also asked people to sign a petition rejecting the 
Easter celebration. e police sided with the FJI and suggested the 
church cancel the planned celebration. Despite this, the Easter mass 
was celebrated modestly in another church. After the FJI’s success in 
cancelling the Easter celebration, it then pursued the issue that the 
church had no government permit, and demanded the church be 
closed. e church was closed down. Furthermore, the FJI also attacked 
Aminuddin Aziz, an activist of Lintas Iman, an NGO which promotes 
inter-religious dialogue and who helped the victims of Girisubo church 
(Frontjihadislam.or.id 2014d). 
Although the FJI and the FPI share the same mission of establishing 
Islamic morality in public, the two are in competition in Yogyakarta, 
so much so that conìicts between them were unavoidable (Vivanews 
2012b; Vivanews 2012a). In Yogyakarta the FJI prevailed and was 
dominant in propagating anti-Shia sentiment. e FJI distributed 
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brochures and posted billboards with anti-Shia content, for example 
stating that Shia is not part of Islam (Frontjihadislam.or.id 2014c). 
Another public anti-Shia campaign waged by the FJI involved the 
circulation of a video on nikah mut‘ah (contract marriage) which, for the 
FJI, is a form of prostitution. e FJI also sent letters to various Islamic 
organizations about the danger of spreading Shia with clandestine 
support from the Islamic Republic of Iran. e FJI also recalled the 
MUI’s 1984 edict about Shia raíḍah, a sect of Shia which truly deviates 
from Sunni Islam (Front Jihad Islam 2014b). e radical groups also 
spread rumors that Shia are agents of Israel and friends of the Jews. ey 
also said that Shia followers are not honest, as they practice the doctrine 
of taqīyah, hiding their faith and religious teachings among the Sunni 
majority (Front Jihad Islam 2014b; Frontjihadislam.or.id 2014c). e 
FJI also warned some Islamic organizations to beware of the Shia’s 
intention to turn some places into Shia centers. Finally, the FJI sent a 
letter to the Iranian embassy in Jakarta asking them to stop spreading 
Shia (Front Jihad Islam 2014a). Sending letters, publicly campaigning, 
distributing brochures, and posting billboards were not suﬃcient for 
the FJI, who then put their anti-Shia sentiment into action. In doing 
so, 30 members of the group halted an Islamic sermon held on May 18, 
2014, in Kasihan, Bantul, because the sermon was attended by Omar 
Shihab, a preacher and member of the MUI Jakarta, whom the FJI 
accused of being a Shia adherent. Again, the Bantul police sided with 
the perpetrators, forcing the sermon to halt and the committee to make 
a public apology for their indiﬀerence in choosing a preacher with Shia 
aﬃliation (Frontjihadislam.or.id 2014g). 
According to Kamaludiningrat (2014), the FJI is the youth wing of 
the MMI, whose leaders met with those of the MIUMI on June 11, 
2013, in order to consolidate their common anti-Shia feeling before 
launching the threat to attack the Rausyan. e meeting between the 
MMI leaders, Muhammad alib (the Amir/MMI President), Abu Jibril 
and Irfan S. Awwas (members of the Lajnah Tanídziyah, or executive 
board), Muhammad Syawal (the commander in the ëeld) and those of 
the MIUMI (Bachtiar Nasir, the Secretary-General) and Fahmi Salim 
(the Vice Secretary-General) took place at the MIUMI’s oﬃce in Tebet, 
Jakarta. Both organizations agreed that their most urgent agenda was 
to ëght the Shia. e MIUMI focused their ëght on “Shia, liberalism, 
and secularism, by rejecting the spread of Shia and the Miss World 
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contest in Bali.” In the forum Abu Jibril also branded Shia as inëdels. 
ey hoped that together MIUMI and the MMI could work hand-in-
hand to eradicate Shia in Indonesia, a jihad which should be performed 
by both intellectuals and warriors. ese Islamist leaders also realized 
that the two organizations are diﬀerent in nature: the MIUMI has 
intellectual endeavors, whereas the FJI stresses a real ‘jihad’ in society. 
Despite this, there was consensus that the two should join forces to 
eradicate the ‘enemy’ (Desastian 2013). 
e next sections will further clarify the roles of the conservative 
think tank MIUMI in spreading the anti-Shia propaganda and those of 
the FJI which was responsible in carrying out the persecution.   
e New Conservative ink Tank Miumi
e new think tank conservative group MIUMI, which carries on 
the DDI’s anti-Shia work, has not attracted scholarly attention yet. 
However, its role in the attempt at homogenizing Indonesian Sunni 
Islam is clear, particularly in propagating about the supposedly deviant 
status of minorities (Takwin et al. 2016). We can also learn about 
this group from its website, in which the writings of its activists are 
published.  On the MIUMI’s website, www.miumipusat.org/wp, the 
group explains that the organization is mainly concerned with the weak 
Muslim leadership in Indonesia (Miumipusat.org 2013b). Like the FPI, 
FJI, and MMI, the MIUMI also publicizes amar makruf nahi mungkar 
as its slogan in the struggle for public order and piety. e MIUMI 
also focuses on the moral decadence of Indonesian Muslims. Unlike 
the abovementioned radical groups, which use force and intimidation 
in establishing public piety, the MIUMI urges Muslims to perform 
intellectual endeavors, such as engaging in research to improve the 
level of education of the ‘ummah. In this regard, the MIUMI harbors 
a better vision than the mere practical and pragmatic orientation of 
other radical groups, as the MIUMI tries to encourage leadership 
with Islamic values, by which the institution should be a place where 
activists and ulama build solidarity in the struggle to promote Islamic 
values (Miumipusat.org 2013a; Muttaqin 2014). 
One may say that the MIUMI is the elite wing of conservative 
and radical groups in Indonesia. Whereas the radicals act mainly at 
the street level, the MIUMI uses reasoned arguments to justify what 
the FPI, FJI, and MMI have done. Ideologically, the MIUMI oﬀers 
Homogenizing Indonesian Islam   17
DOI: 10.15408/sdi.v24i1.3354Studia Islamika, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2017
nothing diﬀerent to the other radical groups, but the MIUMI’s 
methods and means are diﬀerent theirs. On its oﬃcial website, the 
MIUMI’s declaration is written in three languages: Arabic, (poor) 
English, and Bahasa Indonesia. One important point in the declaration 
states that the MIUMI is concerned with the “crisis in ‘aqīdah (faith) 
and akhlāq (morality), lack of knowledge, confusion in thinking, and 
weak leadership” in the Muslim community. Like the FPI, FJI, and 
MMI, the MIUMI is anxious about the “strong wind of liberalization 
and deviant religious teachings which have threatened the ‘aqīdah and 
unity of the ummah”. us, the MIUMI’s mission to “strengthen the 
‘aqīdah and knowledge to establish the unity among the ‘ummah” 
(Miumipusat.org 2013a). 
However, in response to several cases, the MIUMI’s stance is no 
diﬀerent from that of the FJI. In Aceh, for instance, the MIUMI 
defends the implementation of sharia and has attacked those whom they 
consider to be the enemies of sharia (Hadi 2014). Further, the MIUMI 
has opposed feminism and the recent campaign for gender equity 
(Zarkasyi 2014b; Humas miumi 2014). Like the FPI, FJI, and MMI, 
the MIUMI also suspects that non-Muslims want to destroy Islam in 
Indonesia (Miumipusat.org 2013c). e MIUMI also protested the 
policy of gender equity in 2012 before the House of Representatives 
arguing that gender equity is part of liberalization, humanism, pluralism, 
materialism, and secularism which should all be rejected. In a meeting 
on September 29, 2014, led by Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi (chairman), 
Bachtiar Nasir, Farid Okbah, Adian Husaini, Syamsuddin Arif, and 
Adnin Armas, the conservative position of women in the family was 
defended according to their interpretation of Islam (Humas MIUMI 
2014). On another occasion, MIUMI chairman, Zarkasyi demonized 
the concept of postmodernism which in his view means rejecting all 
values and deënitions, including sex and gender (Zarkasyi 2014b). 
All in all, the anti-Shia campaign became the main agenda of the 
MIUMI in 2013 and 2014. To begin with, the council supported 
the MUI’s East Java fatwa on Shia (MIUMI 2012). e council’s 
website also published many papers and several news items about 
the way in which the Shia has deviated from true (Sunni) Islam. For 
instance, the writing of Kholili Hasib (a board member of the MIUMI 
for East Java) drew attention to the misleading ritual of the Shia in 
excessively honoring Husain. Hasib described how the morning ritual 
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of ‘Āshūrā’, which is mixed with Persian beliefs, and consists of beating 
the body, has deviated from true Islam (Hasib 2014). Ilham Kadir, an 
activist from the Central Institute of Islamic Studies (Lembaga Pusat 
Pengkajian Islam/LPPI), also wrote an article on the MIUMI’s website. 
In the article, Kadir denied the role of Shia in bringing Islam to the 
Indonesian archipelago. But Kadir wrote apologetically that Islam came 
to Indonesia from Saudi Arabia in the seventh century directly under the 
knowledge and by order of the Prophet to his companion Muadh bin 
Jabal. In the article, Kadir’s aim is to show is that Islam in Indonesia is a 
genuine product of seventh century Islam and comes directly from the 
Prophet Muhammad (Kadir 2013). Kholili Hasib also wrote another 
article examining the way in which the Shia has become deviant. e 
teachings of Shia, for Hasib, are misleading in assuming that Ali b. Abi 
Talib is the sole inheritor of the Prophet’s political power in Medina; 
and that they condemn and insult other companions of the Prophet 
(Hasib 2014). Hasib wrote another article about the clandestine spread 
of Shia teachings in Indonesia through two primary means: ukhūwah 
(brotherhood and solidarity among Muslims) and taqīyah (hiding 
faith). He also reports on the Shia founding many organizations, chief 
among which are ABI (Ahlu Bait Indonesia) and IJABI (Ikatan Jamaah 
Ahlul Bait Indonesia/e Indonesian Association of the Family of the 
Prophet) (Hasib 2013). 
e Role of the MUI
Serving as a bridge connecting the government’s legitimacy to rule 
and Muslim community’s interest since the New Order, MUI has 
undergone various transformations and contestations inside the body. 
However, after the reform period the conservative tone has prevailed 
(Ichwan 2013). In the case of Rausyan Fikr, one cannot ignore the role 
of the MUI’s conservative wing in nurturing anti-Shia sentiment. To 
begin with, in 1984 the central MUI released the tawṣīyah warning 
about the danger of the Shia (Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) 2011, 
46–47; Formichi 2014b). e deviant status of Shia is mentioned in 
the fatwa issued in 2012 by the East Java MUI. e East Java MUI 
also went further to say that the Shia doubt the authenticity of the 
Qur’an, allow contract marriage (mut‘ah) and bloodshed of the Sunni 
Muslims, insult the Prophet’s wife Aishah, and believe that the Shia 
people were created by God from white soil, whereas non-Shias 
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were created from black soil. For these reasons, Shi’ism is considered 
“sesat dan menyesatkan” (misguided and misguiding). (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia (MUI) Propinsi Jawa Timur 2012). In a similar vein, the 
central MUI published a book which further elaborates on the dangers 
of Shi’ism to Sunnis in Indonesia (Tim Penulis MUI Pusat 2014). e 
book also provides information about the development of Shi’ism in 
Indonesia and its centers in Jakarta (ICC/Islamic Cultural Center), 
Pekalongan (Al Hadi Islamic boarding school), Yogyakarta (about 
fourteen institutions, one of which is Rausyan Fikr), Pasuruan (Yayasan 
Pendidikan Islam/Foundation of Islamic Education YAPI), Bandung 
(IJABI), Makassar, Lombok, Lampung, Aceh, Riau and Bali. e book 
presents a list of websites, institutions, foundations, schools, publishers 
(including the famous Mizan), radio and television stations, and other 
groups. For the radicals who want to attack the Shia, the book is a 
useful guide. For the Shia groups, however, the list contained in the 
book is frightening. 
In light of the MIUMI’s recent anti-Shia propaganda and the MUI’s 
1984 fatwa, the recent threat to attack the Rausyan in Yogyakarta is not 
surprising. Both the MUIMI publication and MUI fatwa are clearly 
useful as theological justiëcation for the terror. Whereas radical groups 
such as the FJI were responsible for the execution of the terror, both 
the MIUMI and the MUI are responsible for laying the foundational 
ideology for the homogenization of Indonesian Sunni Islam. 
For the writing of this paper, I also interviewed three leaders of the MUI 
Yogyakarta. eir views on the spread of anti-Shia feeling demonstrate 
conservatism and thus support the grand scenario of homogenizing 
Islam in the country. M. oha Abdurrahman5 chairman of the MUI 
Yogyakarta since 2001 (Abdurrahman 2014), believes that Shi’ism is 
indeed deviant, recalling the arguments in the MUI fatwa. However, he 
disagrees with the FJI’s plan to threaten the Shia with violence. oha’a 
attitude is thus ambiguous. All the same, he tried to serve as a mediator 
between the two factions. He also claimed to have communicated with 
the two, with both visiting his house for consultation. 
oha explained that the FJI is a new radical group, consisting of 
both MMI and FPI members. He also said that the MUI Yogyakarta 
has accommodated the MII and FPI but not the FJI on its board. 
oha proudly said that Habib Rizieq, the top leader in Jakarta, also 
often called oha. A communicative person, oha has held talks 
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with all factions within Islam; he used to communicate with Abu Bakr 
Baasyir, currently imprisoned on terrorism charges on the island of 
Nusa Kambangan. 
oha had also heard that the Indonesian Shia were waging an anti-
Qur’an campaign, claiming that the Muslim scripture is an inauthentic 
document. However, when oha met with the Shia group on the issue 
he concluded that this suspicion was unfounded. As he tries to maintain 
a position of neutrality between the two factions, oha’s position is 
often diﬃcult. During the reconciliation meeting at the local oﬃce of 
the Ministry of Religious Aﬀairs in Yogyakarta, the FJI threatened to 
burn the oﬃce. During the meeting, the FJI aggressively attacked the 
Shia with harsh and vulgar words. e FJI was indeed oﬀensive, an 
attitude which, for oha, is wrong. 
oha tried to convince me that the MUI always tried to mediate 
between the two factions and to ease the tension. However, on December 
12, 2013, the council released a letter which clearly sided with the FJI, 
further cornering the Shia. e letter says that many Shia groups in 
Indonesia have created disorder in society, such as in Bangil, Jember, 
and Sampang. e letter also underscores that the Shia is truly a deviant 
group. Not only does the letter call upon the government and police to 
monitor the Shia, it also summons the authority to prosecute the Shia 
based on the 1965 blasphemy law (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Daerah 
Istimewa Yogyakarta 2013; Front Jihad Islam 2013). Given this, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the letter posted on the FJI website serves 
as justiëcation for the radical group to further terrorize the minority. 
Upon hearing that several FJI members planned to attack the Shia 
group on Kaliurang Street, Muhsin Kamaludiningrat,6 currently the 
secretary of the MUI Yogyakarta, contacted the police and Syukri 
Fadholi,7 a politician who controlled many conservative groups with 
links to the PPP (Kamaludiningrat 2014). Muhsin also followed the 
development of the case, particularly when the FJI, the MUI, the police, 
the MMI, and the local Religious Aﬀairs oﬃce, planned a meeting. On 
this occasion, Muhsin reminded the FJI not to harm the Shia group, 
but to call upon them to use their wisdom and return to the true Islam. 
Muhsin, like oha, highlighted the misleading teachings of the Shia to 
me by reiterating the MUI fatwa. Muhsin also underscored that if the 
Shia indeed injured Sunni Muslims and insulted the true teachings of 
Islam—these were blasphemous deeds which should be brought to trial. 
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However, Muhsin refused to follow the edict of the MUI of East 
Java which branded the Shia deviant as demanded by the FJI, of which 
his nephew was an active member. Like oha, Muhsin asked police 
and local intelligence to monitor the Shia. 
Once Yunahar Ilyas8 received a phone enquiry from the Sleman 
police about the FJI, which planned to attack the Rausyan Fikr on 
Kaliurang Street to expel the Shia from the city. Yunahar suggested 
the police contact Muhsin, the secretary of the MUI of Yogyakarta. 
Yunahar, as a board member of the national MUI in Jakarta, did not 
know much about aﬀairs in Yogyakarta. In fact, the MUI has written 
a book explaining the danger of Shia in Indonesia (Tim Penulis MUI 
Pusat 2014). Yunahar, however, stressed that violence should be avoided 
and that Shia Zaidiyah, whose teachings are similar to those of Sunni, 
came to the archipelago centuries ago. Yunahar also mentioned that 
some of the Zaidiyah ulama’s books, such as the compilation of hadiths 
by al-Shawkānī (1759–1834M) (e.g. Shawkānī 2002), are accepted by 
Sunnis. However, Yunahar is concerned about the recent converts from 
Indonesian Sunni to Shia, some of whom travelled to Qum to deepen 
their knowledge of Shi’ism and upon their return spread Shia teachings. 
Reiterating the MUI’s fatwa, Yunahar warned of the danger of Shia 
Raëdah, which rejects the caliphates of Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman, 
whom the denomination also condemns for depriving Ali of his right 
to caliphate. is denomination also often holds rituals on the Karbala 
day and Id Ala Ghadir Khum, a ceremony to memorialize when Ali b. 
Abi Talib was appointed as the Prophet’s successor. In Jakarta, a Shia 
group once celebrated the Ghadir Khum by holding a seminar in which 
former president Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY) was invited to open 
the ceremony. e Jakarta police issued the permit. However, when the 
police consulted the MUI, Yunahar responded that the MUI rejects 
the Shia celebration. e police then planned something else. During 
the seminar, the leader of IJABI, Jalaludin Rakhmat, announced that 
the ceremony would be made shorter. Outside the building a FPI 
crowd besieged the building. It seems that the police invited the FPI 
and allowed the radicals to besiege the place (Ilyas 2014). In this vein, 
Yunahar believes the police acted unwisely in playing a political game 
by using the FPI to stop the ceremony. 
For Yunahar, Shia only created problems in Indonesia. Its presence 
in the country resulted in many anti-Shia reactions often involving 
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violence. For Yunahar, the MIUMI also played a role in curtailing the 
Shia movement in Indonesia and preventing the denomination from 
spreading, and in defending Sunni theology. 
Yunahar was invited to speak at a MUI book launch at the end of 
2013 at UGM, attended by the district head (Bupati), Sri Purnomo. 
Yunahar admitted that during the seminar he warned against the use 
of violence. 
We cannot condemn them [Shia] either and brand them as inëdels, but 
we can just explain the true reality. We, including Sri Purnomo, prevented 
people from hunting out Shia followers in Yogyakarta. Our job is to 
explain; whether individuals heed our advice is not our issue anymore. 
What we have done is to guard the people’s faith. e forum discussing 
the Shia groups, like Ahmadiyah, was the way in which the MUI warned 
the public about their dangerous teachings. Many followers of Ahmadiyah 
then converted back to Islam. Many questions were posed about the 
diﬀerences between Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyah, and we explained 
them (Ilyas 2014).
Local Authorities
Local authorities contributed to the worsening persecution of the 
Shia group in their inaction not to enforce law by siding with the 
victims.  Nor did the police make any eﬀort to deter, much less to arrest, 
the FJI, but rather put pressure on the victims. It seems that the police 
communicated with both the perpetrators and the victims. However, 
they avoided direct confrontation with the perpetrators. Rather, the 
police acted as ‘mediator’ between perpetrators and victims. In short, 
the police did not protect or defend the weak minority group, neither 
did they punish the perpetrators.
Compared to the case of the Shia community of Sampang in 
Madura, who were attacked and expelled from their villages, the case of 
Yogyakarta was diﬀerent. In Sampang it is likely that the district head 
was afraid of losing people’s votes in the next election if he opposed the 
Sunni majority. e local government in Sampang did not dare protect 
the minority, which was therefore branded deviant by the MUI of East 
Java (Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) Propinsi Jawa Timur 2012). e 
FJI in Yogyakarta also pursued the same direction and failed. e stance 
of Sultan Hamengkubuwono X of Yogyakarta may be signiëcance in 
inìuencing how the police engage in religious conìict in Yogyakarta. 
He proposed an initiative to hold a dialogue between the two conìicting 
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parties. e Sultan was seen as a protector of the religious harmony and 
diversity in Yogyakarta, a town known for its tolerance and plurality. 
However, the case of Rausyan Fikr seems to give a diﬀerent image of the 
Sultan. Despite his role in inviting all diﬀerent factions to dialogue, he, 
like the local government of Yogyakarta, did not pursue enforcing the 
law by punishing the perpetrators and protecting the victims. Instead, 
rumors circulated in the town that the Sultan had built special relations 
with certain conservative groups, or at least he took advantage of the 
instable situation to suppress various issues of sultanate succession, 
economic imbalance, and the growth of his wealth. 
On the other hand, the local Ministry of Religious Aﬀairs in Sleman 
also refused to publicly name the Shia as a deviant group. However, 
Andayani (Andayani 2014) heard that the threat to do so was supported 
by several local politicians. For instance, she heard a rumor that Syukri 
Fadoli, the former mayor of Yogyakarta and former politician of the 
National Mandate Party (PAN), who was running for a parliamentary 
seat under the banner of the PPP (Development Unity Party) at the 
time, controlled some conservative groups in Yogyakarta. She also 
heard that Durohman and Puji Hartono, the leaders of the FJI, had 
aﬃliations with Fadoli. 
Conclusion
ere are several things that the attack on Rausyan Fikr in Yogyakarta 
can reveal about violence, regulation of religion, and homogenization 
of Islam in Indonesia more widely. Firstly, this paper sees the incident 
of the attack on the Rausyan Fikr in Yogyakarta not as a mere isolated 
incident: rather it should be put into a broader context of the national 
trend of a homogenizing movement within Indonesian Sunni Islam to 
establish orthodoxy. Secondly, this paper ënds new local perpetrators 
(FJI) which were directly responsible in attacking the victims, and 
additionally actors at the national level (MIUMI) who spread anti-
Shia sentiments. e three groups—the victims (Rausyan), FJI, and 
MIUMI—have not received the attention of scholarly discussion yet. 
is study is the ërst attempt to document them. irdly, this paper 
relates the local incident in Yogyakarta to a national trend of persecuting 
minorities considered deviant by conservative and radical groups. In 
doing so, this paper explains the roles of the FJI, MIUMI, MUI, and 
local authorities in the incident and sees the coordination among them 
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in both attacking the victims and spreading the anti-Shia sentiments.
is study ënds that the MIUMI played a vital role in propagating 
anti-Shia sentiment through information posted on their websites 
and in their support for the ideologies of radical groups. eir ideas 
and propaganda served as legitimizing forces in support of radicals in 
spreading violence. In addition, the MIUMI pushed the direction of 
the MUI towards increasingly conservative—if not radical—ideology. 
us, the MIUMI has contributed to the homogenization of Sunni 
Islam in Indonesia through the strengthening the MUI’s agenda of 
establishing orthodox authority in the country (see also Makin 2016a). 
Rhetorically, the MUI leaders in Yogyakarta and Jakarta advocated 
a non-violent approach to dealing with minority Shia groups and 
prevention of attacks by radical groups, but in practice, the MUI 
leaders, as interviewed above, have failed to conceal their support for 
the persecution of Shia groups. ose I interviewed see the diﬀerences 
between Sunni and Shia in theology, political leadership, and ritual 
are problematic and should be ëxed through religious intervention. 
Clearly, the agenda of MUI is to homogenize Indonesian Islam and 
strengthen Sunni orthodoxy, as my previous studies have suggested 
(Makin 2016a; Makin 2015b; Makin 2009).
e police and local authorities, for their part, did not enforce the 
law. Rather the weaker minority was suppressed, while the perpetrators’ 
demands were fulëlled. Local and national Islamist politicians 
supported the agenda of homogenizing Sunni Islam and strengthening 
orthodoxy as they wanted to keep the votes of conservative and radical 
constituents particularly as the general election drew nearer. us, the 
terror on the Rausyan Fikr by the local actors FJI should be put in 
the broader context of homogenizing Indonesian Sunni Islam in which 
both national and local level players contributed to the persecution.  
e case of Rausyan is a test for religious tolerance not only in 
Yogyakarta but also in Indonesia, showing to what extent a vocal 
minority group, like the FJI or MIUMI with the goal of homogenizing 
Islam, can sway the moderate Muslim majority. It seems that the 
majority is not easily inìuenced by the radical minority. In fact, the 
Rausyan still survives carrying on their intellectual activities among 
Sunni majority Muslims in Yogyakarta. 
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Endnotes
1. During the reform period, many conservative and radical groups, such as the FPI 
(Islamic Defenders Front), HTI (Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir), MMI (Indonesian 
Council for Jihadists), FUI (Islamic Community Forum), and FAPB (Anti-Apostasy 
Front of Bekasi), appear to support the agenda of combating deviant sects, and liberal 
interpretation of Islam, which are seen as obstacles to the ‘homogenizing agenda’ and 
establishing Islamic orthodoxy (Makin 2016a, 16). I would like to argue that despite 
diﬀerences and fragmentation in various radical and conservative groups in Indonesia 
in the aftermath of Soeharto’s fall, they share the common belief that those who show 
diﬀerences from them should be condemned as ‘deviant’. In this vein, they often show 
solidarity among them and struggle to uphold the true version of Islam. 
2. ese conservative activists propagated their conservative ideas through popular writings: 
Adian Husaini, for instance, wrote many popular articles and books propagating anti-
liberalism ideology (Husaini 2010; Husaini 2003; Makin 2015a). Zarkasyi also shows 
his stance of anti-Shia feeling in many works (Zarkasyi 2014a). 
3. e INSISTS (Institute for the Study of Islamic ought and Civilizations) was founded 
in 2003 in Kuala Lumpur by conservative activists, such as Adian Husaini, Adnin Armas, 
Fahmi Zarkasyi, and others who also founded the MIUMI later (see below discussion). e 
goal of the INSISTS is to defend Islamist ideology and  íght liberalism and moderate Islamic 
ideology in Indonesia (Husaini 2015); see also n. 2 above.
4. In this vein, the MIUMI supported the East Java MUI fatwa on Shia (MIUMI 2012).
5. He was born in 1936 in Wonosobo and moved to Yogyakata in 1960 to study at the 
PTAIN (Higher School for Islamic Studies) which later became IAIN and UIN. He went 
to several pesantren in Wonosobo, Tegalrejo, and Krapyak, Yogyakarta. He was an NU 
activist and joined the IPNU (Young NU Association) in Magelang, during his time at 
PGAN (High School for Teachers of Islamic Education). After graduating from PTAIN 
in 1965 he became a lecturer. In 1967 he also became member of local parliament (DPRD 
DIY) from the NU faction. In 1969 he was appointed as the head of the provincial oﬃce 
of the Ministry of Religious Aﬀairs (Kakanwil). Since its establishment in 1975, he joined 
the MUI in Yogyakarta, and served as a member of ukhuwah (solidarity). In 1996 he was 
appointed as vice-chairman, and in 2001 he became chairman.
6. Muhsin was born in Gunung Kidul in 1941, ënishing Sekolah Rakyat (People’s School) 
and going to PGA (Religious Teachers’ College) in Solo. In 1958 he went to PHIN 
(Pendidikan Hakim Islam Negeri/State Islamic Judicial Education) and later worked at 
the local oﬃce of Religious Aﬀairs in Palu, Sulawesi. In 1964 he moved to Yogyakarta 
and studied at the Syariah (Islamic law) faculty of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, graduating in 
1971. He then worked at the oﬃce of Religious Aﬀairs in Gunung Kidul and Kulon 
Progo respectively. In 1998 he returned to Yogyakarta to work at IAIN Sunan Kalijaga. 
He joined the MUI in 1980 and currently serves as secretary. 
7. Fadholi, born in 1951, is a Muhammadiyah activist and a PPP (Unity Development 
Party). Politician.  He served as the deputy mayor of Yogyakarta (2001-2006).
8. Yunahar Ilyas was born in Bukittinggi, West Sumatera in 1956 and went to PGA 
there. He moved to Yogyakarta to study at the IAIN Sunan Kalijaga in 1975-1979. He 
then studied law at Ibn Saud University in Riyadh until 1983. In 1983 he returned to 
Yogyakarta to teach at the Mualimin, Muhammadiyah Senior High School. In 1984 
he ënished his BA in Padang. In 1987 he taught at the Muhamadiyah University in 
Yogyakarta (UMY). His MA and PhD were obtained from UIN-Sunan Kalijaga, 
Yogyakarta. He ënished his dissertation in 2004 on Qur’anic exegesis. Yunahar was active 
in the Muhammadiyah Student Association (IPM). At university he also joined IMM 
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(University-level Muhammadiyah Student Association). From 1980-1985 he became a 
central Muhammadiyah board member and in 2005 served as a chairman. Yunahar has 
joined the MUI central board since 2005, serving as a chairman (2005-2015) and vice-
chairman (2015-2020).
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)ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺍﳌﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻟﻠﺘﻌﻠﻴﻢ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﱄ ﺭﻗﻢ: 2102/peK/ITKID/65(.
ﺳﺘﻮﺩﻳﺎ ﺇﺳﻼﻣﻴﻜﺎ ﻋﻀﻮ ﰲ feRssorC )ﺍﻹﺣﺎﻻﺕ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﺑﺘﺔ ﰲ ﺍﻷﺩﺑﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﻛﺎﺩﳝﻴﺔ( ﻣﻨﺬ ٤١٠٢، ﻭﺑﺎﻟﺘﺎﱄ 
ﻓﺈﻥ ﲨﻴﻊ ﺍﳌﻘﺎﻻﺕ ﺍﻟﱵ ﻧﺸﺮﺎ ﻣﺮﻗﻤﺔ ﺣﺴﺐ ﻣﻌّﺮﻑ ﺍﻟﻮﺛﻴﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺮﻗﻤﻴﺔ )IOD(. 
ﺳﺘﻮﺩﻳﺎ ﺇﺳﻼﻣﻴﻜﺎ ﳎﻠﺔ ﻣﻔﻬﺮﺳﺔ ﰲ ﺳﻜﻮﺑﺲ )supocS( ﻣﻨﺬ ٠٣ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ ٥١٠٢. 
ﺳﺘﻮدﯾﺎ إﺳﻼﻣﯿﻜﺎ
ﻣﺠﻠﺔ إﻧﺪوﻧﯿﺴﯿﺎ ﻟﻠﺪراﺳﺎت اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ
اﻟﺴﻨﺔ اﻟﺮاﺑﻌﺔ واﻟﻌﺸﺮون، اﻟﻌﺪد ١، ٧١٠٢
رﺋﻴﺲ اﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﺮ:
ﺃﺯﻳﻮﻣﺎﺭﺩﻱ ﺃﺯﺭﺍ
ﻣﺪﻳﺮ اﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﺮ:
ﺃﻭﻣﺎﻥ ﻓﺘﺢ ﺍﻟﺮﲪﻦ
ﻫﻴﺌﺔ اﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﺮ:
ﺳﻴﻒ ﺍﳌﺰﺍﱐ
ﲨﻬﺎﺭﻱ
ﺩﻳﺪﻳﻦ ﺷﻔﺮﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ
ﺟﺎﺟﺎﺕ ﺑﺮﻫﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ
ﻓﺆﺍﺩ ﺟﺒﻠﻲ
ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﻨﺤﻨﻒ
ﺳﻴﻒ ﺍﻷﻣﻢ
ﻋﺼﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺮﻓﻴﻊ
ﺩﺍﺩﻱ ﺩﺍﺭﻣﺎﺩﻱ
ﺟﺎﺟﺎﻧﺞ ﺟﻬﺮﺍﱐ
ﺩﻳﻦ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ
ﺁﻳﺎﻧﺞ ﺃﻭﺗﺮﻳﺰﺍ ﻳﻘﲔ
ﳎﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﺮ اﻟﺪوﱄ:
ﳏﻤﺪ ﻗﺮﻳﺶ ﺷﻬﺎﺏ )ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺷﺮﻳﻒ ﻫﺪﺍﻳﺔ ﺍﷲ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣﻴﺔ ﲜﺎﻛﺮﺗﺎ(
ﺗﻮﻓﻴﻖ ﻋﺒﺪ ﺍﷲ )ﺍﳌﺮﻛﺰ ﺍﻹﻧﺪﻭﻧﻴﺴﻲ ﻟﻠﻌﻠﻮﻡ(
ﻧﻮﺭ ﺃ. ﻓﺎﺿﻞ ﻟﻮﺑﻴﺲ )ﺍﳉﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣﻴﺔ ﺳﻮﻣﻄﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﺸﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ(
ﻡ. ﺵ. ﺭﻳﻜﻠﻴﻒ )ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺃﺳﺘﺮﺍﻟﻴﺎ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣﻴﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺒﲑﺍ(
ﻣﺎﺭﺗﲔ ﻓﺎﻥ ﺑﺮﻭﻧﻴﺴﲔ )ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺃﺗﺮﳜﺔ(
ﺟﻮﻫﻦ ﺭ. ﺑﻮﻭﻳﻦ  )ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﻭﺍﺷﻨﻄﻦ، ﺳﺎﻧﺘﻮ ﻟﻮﻳﺲ(
ﳏﻤﺪ ﻛﻤﺎﻝ ﺣﺴﻦ )ﺍﳉﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﳌﻴﺔ – ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺰﻳﺎ(
ﻓﺮﻛﻨﻴﺎ ﻡ. ﻫﻮﻛﲑ )ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺃﺳﺘﺮﺍﻟﻴﺎ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣﻴﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺒﲑﺍ(
ﺇﻳﺪﻭﻳﻦ ﻑ. ﻭﻳﺮﳒﺎ )ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﻛﻮﻟﻮﻧﻴﺎ، ﺃﳌﺎﻧﻴﺎ(
ﺭﻭﺑﲑﺕ ﻭ. ﻫﻴﻔﻨﲑ )ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺑﻮﺳﺘﻮﻥ(
ﺭﳝﻲ ﻣﺎﺩﻳﻨﲑ )ﺍﳌﺮﻛﺰ ﺍﻟﻘﻮﻣﻲ ﻟﻠﺒﺤﺚ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﻲ ﺑﻔﺮﻧﺴﺎ(
ﺭ. ﻣﻴﻜﺎﺋﻴﻞ ﻓﻴﻨﲑ )ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺳﻴﻨﻐﺎﻓﻮﺭﺍ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣﻴﺔ(
ﻣﻴﻜﺎﺋﻴﻞ ﻑ. ﻟﻔﺎﻥ )ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﻓﺮﻳﻨﺸﺘﻮﻥ(
ﻣﺴﺎﻋﺪ ﻫﻴﺌﺔ اﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﺮ:
ﺗﻴﺴﺘﺮﻳﻮﻧﻮ
ﳏﻤﺪ ﻧﺪﺍﺀ ﻓﻀﻼﻥ
ﺇﻧﺪﻱ ﺃﻭﻟﻴﺎﺀ ﻏﺮﺍﺩﻳﺎﻥ
ﻣﺮاﺟﻌﺔ اﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻹﳒﻠﻴﺰﻳﺔ:
ﺷﲑﱄ ﺑﺎﻛﲑ
ﻛﻴﻔﲔ ﻭ. ﻓﻮﻍ
ﻣﺮاﺟﻌﺔ اﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ:
ﻧﻮﺭﺻﻤﺪ
ﺗﻮﺑﺎﻏﻮﺱ ﺃﺩﻱ ﺃﺳﻨﺎﻭﻱ
ﺗﺼﻤﻴﻢ اﻟﻐﻼف:
ﺱ. ﺑﺮﻧﻜﺎ


Volume 24, Number 1, 2017
E-ISSN: 2355-6145
B  I V:
A R T
  C  I  
Maizer Said Nahdi & Eka Sulistiyowati
R B: T L O C  B 
  F W W ǫǳǫǫ-ǫǳǬǮ  
Frial Ramadhan Supratman
H I I: 
P   S   Y  
Al Makin
ﻰﻄﺳﻮﻟا ﻪﻴﺸﺗأ ﻲﻓ قﻼﻄﻟا ﺪﻌﺑ ﺔﻧﺎﻀﺤﻟا رﻮﺻ
ﺎﻏﺎﺟ ﻲﻟﺎﻛ نﺎﻧﻮﺳ ﺔﻴﺼﺨﺷ
ﺔﻴﻣﻼﺳﻹا مارﺎﺗﺎﻣ ﺪﻴﻟﺎـﻘﺗ ﻲﻓ
ﻱﺯﻮﻓ
٢٠١٧ ،١ ﺩﺪﻌﻟﺍ ،ﻥﻭﺮﺸﻌﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻌﺑﺍﺮﻟﺍ ﺔﻨﺴﻟﺍ
ﻲﺣﻮﺼﻧ ﺪﻣﺎﺣ
